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AMICUS CURIAE: FRIEND OF THE COURT
FRANK M. COVEY, JR.A AMICUS CURIAE has been defined as one who, as a by-stander,
may inform the court when the judge is doubtful or mistaken
in a matter of law.1 The term includes both attorneys and lay-
men who interpose in a judicial proceeding to assist the court.
The amicus curiae should be, as the term implies, a friend of the
court. He should attempt to aid the court rather than the parties. "It
is for the honour of the court to avoid errors in its judgment. ."...2 He
should aid the court by bringing forth only the truth, not false infor-
mation. As the bench reprimanded an amicus in The Prince's Case3
"[I]n truth the Serjeant and his son have not performed the office of a
friend or of a good informer, for they have omitted one clause in [the
grant].. . ." The term implies the friendly intervention of counsel to
remind the court of some matter of law which might otherwise es-
cape its notice, and in regard to which it might go wrong.4
The ordinary purpose of an amicus curiae brief in a civi. action is to inform
the court as to facts or situations which may have escaped consideration or to
remind the court of legal matters which have escaped its notice and regarding
which it appears to be in danger of making a wrong interpretation. 5
The status of the amicus curiae ends when he has pointed out the
error or made his suggestion to the court. Such intervention is granted
not as a matter of right but of privilege, and the privilege ends when
the suggestion has been made.6
In defining the role of the amicus curiae it may be helpful to point
out three things that he is not. He is not an agency or arm of the
court; he can not perform the functions of the court. He is not a
1 2 Am. Jur., Amicus Curiae § 2 (1936).
2 Counsel's argument, Protector v. Geering, Hardes 85, 86, 145 [1656] 145 All E.R.
394 (Ex.).
3 [1606] 77 All E.R. 496, 516.
4 Hamlin v. "Perticuler Baptist Meeting House," 103 Me. 343, 69 Ad. 315 (1907).
5 State v. Finley, 242 Minn. 288, 294, 295, 64 N.W. 2d 769, 773 (1954).
G Baylcy v. Clark, 153 111. App. 154 (1910).
M. CovEy is a member of the Illinois Bar and a Teaching Associate in Law at North-
,western University. He received a B.S. degree in 1954 and a J.D. degree in 1957, both
from Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois.
AMICUS CURIAE: FRIEND OF THE COURT
party and is not bound by the resulting judgment. Finally, he is not
an intervenor or intervening party to the suit.
An arnicus curiae cannot perform the functions of the court. In a
divorce proceeding the court cannot refer the cause to an amicus to
make findings upon which the decree will be based.7 Yet the courts
have allowed the appointment of an amicus to make investigations and
conduct hearings in a contempt citation.8
An amicus is not a party to the suit and is not bound by the result-
ing judgment.9 But if the amicus takes an active part in the law suit,
such as making motions, he may be found to have become a party. 10
Neither is the amicus an intervenor." There are two principal dis-
tinctions between the intervenor practice and the amicus practice, and
the first flows from the second. In an intervention, the intervening
party is bound by the resulting judgment; an amicus is not bound in
any way except by the precedent of the case.12 The principal differ-
ence between the two lies in the requirement of interest for each. To
act as an amicus, one must have some interest in the outcome of the
suit. This interest may consist in being the attorney of record in a
pending suit involving similar questions,13 a specific public interest,"
the desire to protect a minor's estate, 5 the desire to prevent a collu-
sive suit,' pointing out error to the court 7 or the protection of a
criminal defendant.' However, to intervene, one must have a direct
interest in the res of the suit.' 9 There must be an interest in the sub-
7 Traistar v.Traistar, 306 Ill. App. 509, 29 N.E. 2d 286 (1940).
8 People v. Goss, 10 1ll2d 533,141 N.E2d 385 (1957); Anderson v. Macek, 350 I!1. 135,
182 N.E. 745 (1932).
9 Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F. 2d 915 (C.A. 7th, 1953); Pueblo de Taos v. Archuleta, 64
F. 2d 807 (C.C.A. 10th, 1933). This rule does not apply in Texas, which recognizes no
special appearance, where the amicus paid by the defendant appears to suggest the lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Burger v. Burger, 298 S.W. 2d 119
(Tex, 1957).
10 Dean v. Gerlach, 34 111. App. 233 (1889).
" See Walker v. Reynolds Metals Co., 87 F. Supp. 283 (Ore., 1949).
12 Galbreath v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 134 F. 2d 569 (C.C.A. 10th, 1943).
1s Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 191 US. 555 (1903).
14 Carazalla v. State, 269 Wis. 593, 71 N.W. 2d 276 (1955).
15 Ex parte Guernsey, 21 Ill. 442 (1859).
16 McAdams v. People, 179 Iil. 316, 53 N.E. 1102 (1899).
17 The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276 (C.C.A. 2d, 1920).
18 3 Coke's Institutes 29 (Brooke ed., 1779).
19 Pure Oil Co. v. Ross, 170 F. 2d 651 (CA. 7th, 1948).
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ject-matter of the litigation of such a nature that he will gain or lose
by the direct legal operation of the judgment.
POWER OF THE COURT TO SEEK OR PERMIT AN AMICUS
A court has the power to seek the services of an amicus curiae
where it feels the practice is necessary or advisable.2° The power ex-
tends to assisting or advising the court; calling to its attention factors
that may have escaped its attention; making suggestions in matters in
which the court may proceed on its own motion, or in matters of
practice and aiding the court by the performance of certain labors
and examinations necessary to guide the court to a proper conclusion.
The American courts have long exercised this prerogative, e.g., in
183 3 a representative of the government was asked to appear in a case
involving the status of a naval officer.2 In terms of present practice,
the appearance of an amicus is most common in cases involving the
fields of domestic relations, jurisdiction and practice, corporate re-
organizations 22 and civil rights cases. 23 There remain, however, rem-
nants of the contrary practice, including a rare example of counsel
being called upon in open court to act as amicus solely due to his acci-
dental presence in the court when the case was reached.24
It is also clear that the court has the power to accept the services
tendered to it by one who wishes to act as amicus curiae. It is not er-
ror for the trial judge to receive the suggestions of an amicus curiae.
[The] application . .. for the privilege of so appearing is of no personal
concern to the parties, and the court may grant or refuse the request, accord-
ing as it deems the proffered information timely or useful or otherwise. 25
Such acceptance of advice is the right of the court, even though both
parties should object.26 The parties to the case should be informed of
the suggestions of the amicus and time should be given to them to re-
sist or explain the matter brought forward by the amicus.
2o Pokorny, "Friend of the Court" Aids Detroit Judges in Divorce Cases, 29 J. Am.
Jud. Soc. 166, 167 (1946).
21 Ex parte Randolph, 20 Fed. Cas. 242, No. 11558 (C.C.A. Va., 1833).
2 Beckwith & Sobernheim, Amicus Curiae-Minister of Justice, 17 Ford L. Rev. 38,
46 (1948).
23 Bernstein, Volunteer Amici Curiae in Civil Rights Cases, 1 N. Y. Stud. L. Rev. 95
(1952).
24 In re Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 492, 179 At. 357 (1935).
25 The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276, 279 (C.C.A. 2d, 1920).
26 Sampson v. Commissioners of Highways, 115 Il. App. 443 (1904); Ex parte Guern-
sey, 21 Ill. 442 (1859). But see Charleston v. Cadle, 167 111. 647 (1897).
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Since the acceptance of the services tendered by an amicus is the
right of the court, the parties can in no way complain. The granting
or denial of the privilege to appear lies wholly within the discretion
of the court and is not reviewable.2 7 However, the admission of the
amicus' suggestion as evidence may be assigned as error if it was in
any manner legally inadmissible.
In short, it is the inherent right of the court to seek or permit the
services of an amicus curiae, and the parties or intended amicus have
no grounds for appeal from any decision on the matter since it is
wholly within the discretion of the court.
ORIGIN OF THE AMICUS PRACTICE
In the early Common Law the practice of allowing any person pres-
ent in court to step forward as amicus curiae and inform or advise the
court is as old as the reported cases themselves. The Year Book cases
as far back as 1353 deem it an accepted practice.28 In 1468 the court
stated: "Any man can inform the court in the case so that the court
will not render judgment on an insufficient record."2" In this case the
court used the terms "amicus curiae & amicus juris."
In a 1573 abridgement, there are three references to the amicus
practice.30 In one reference the author states: "[I]n an improper in-
dictment any man, as amicus curiae, can inform the court of error in
order to prevent the court from suffering the mistake." 3'
In 1656, on the verge of modem practice, a case reports the prac-
tice as being based on the honor of the court to avoid error and to
prevent barbarism resulting from gross and apparent errors.3 2
There can be no doubt as to the age and wide acceptance of the
amicus curiae. As to its origin, on the other hand, there is a great deal
of doubt. Like so many things of great age, its roots are lost even
though the practice still continues. There is little material available on
the beginnings of the amicus practice. One writer contends that the
practice is based on the Roman consilium, an officer of the Roman
court appointed by the judge to advise him on points on which he
27 Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F. 2d 915 (C.A. 7th, 1953).
28Y.B. Hil. 26 Ed. 111,65 (1353).
2 9 Y.B. 7 Ed. IV, 16 (1486).
80 Brooke, Le Grande Abridgement (1573).
31 Ibid, Errors S 49.
32 Protector v. Geering, Hardes 85, 86 [1656] 145 All E.R. 394 (Ex.).
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was in doubt. It is then contended that this practice became incorpo-
rated into the English system as the amicus curiae.33
This explanation does not seem sufficient. First, the consilium could
not inform the court on his own initiative, as the amicus curiae may,
but could only act on the request of the court. 4 The consilium when
requested by the court could act against a criminal defendant, while
an amicus curiae may never appear against a criminal defendant.
This constitutes two significant differences between the amicus prac-
tice and the consiliurn practice; in the latter, counsel may act only at
the request of the court, and may appear against a criminal defendant,
while in the former, counsel may appear either at the request of the
court or on his own initiative and may not appear against a criminal
defendant. These differences raise a serious doubt to the contention
that the amicus practice is merely an off-shoot of the.Roman consili-
urn practice. These differences would not preclude the possibility that
the consilium practice was the source of those facets of the amicus
practice that are similar to it.
There is another source from which the amicus practice may have
arisen. In the scant historical data there is no direct confirmation or
denial, but there is some secondary confirmation that would tend to
show its validity.
At the early Common Law and until the middle Common Law, the
defendant in a serious criminal charge was not allowed the benefit of
counsel. "It was a very ancient principle that no counsel was allowed
to persons charged with treason or felony against the Crown ...""
However, a criminal defendant must be protected from any errors of
law, and unless he were a lawyer himself, he would be unable to pro-
vide this protection. It is probable that the amicus practice, or at least
one phase of it, sprang up to fill this gap. Since the court would be
unaware of the error of law, for if they were aware of it they could
remedy it themselves, the amicus curiae could not wait to be asked for
his advice, as the consiliun, but must be able to thrust it upon the
court.
This theory finds some justification in the early writers. Although
1 i Bouvier's Law Dictionary 188 (3rd ed., 1946).
34 lVenger, Institutes of the Roman Law of Civil Procedure 32, 202 (1925).
35 State v. Finley, 242 Minn. 288, 64 N.W. 2d 769 (1954). See United States v. Brokaw,
60 F. Supp. 100 (S.D. Ill., 1945).
36 Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 385 (3rd ed., 1940).
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the amicus was common in civil cases, the only mention of the amicus
practice made by Coke is in the Criminal Law section of the Institutes.
Further concerning the practice he writes:
And after the plea of not guilty, the prisoner can have no counsel assigned
to him to answer the king's counsel learned, nor to defend him. * * * [Any
learned man that is present may inform the court for the benefit of the pris-
oner of anything that may make the proceedings erroneous. 3 7
Coke also states "[A]ny man that is in the court may inform the court
of any of these matters, lest the court should error and the prisioner
unjustly for his life proceded with. ' 38 Chitty also describes the prac-
tice only under the criminal law. 9
This theory of the origin of the amicus, a means of assuring sub-
stantive due process to a criminal defendant who could not have the
benefit of counsel, would explain how the amicus can act on his own
motion and not merely on the request of the court and would explain
why he cannot appear against a criminal defendant.
It is more than likely that the amicus practice by 1600 was shaped
by both of these factors. Whichever predated the other in influence,
the Roman or the criminal law practice, was significantly modified by
the other, with the modern amicus practice as a result of the two.
THE AMICUS CURIAE IN AMERICA
The amicus practice crossed the Atlantic with the first lawyer to
bring along his Coke's Institutes. The practice appears in several early
cases. In Green v. Biddle° Henry Clay appeared as an amicus in a
case resulting from a boundary dispute between Kentucky and Vir-
ginia. In Ex parte Randolph," R. C. Nicholas, a representative of the
United States government appeared at the request of the court in a
case concerning the status of a naval officer. The practice was recog-
nized in Illinois as early as 1859.42
The amicus curiae has been a familiar sight in the Supreme Court
of the United States. In the Employer's Liability Cases,43 the Attor-
873 Coke's Institutes 29 (Brooke ed., 1779).
38 3 Coke's Institutes 137 (Brooke ed., 1779).
89 1 Chitty, Criminal Law 308 (2d ed., 1832).
408Wheat. (U.S.) 1 (1823).
41 Ex parte Randolph, 20 Fed. Cas. 242, No. 11558 (C.C.A. Va., 1833).
42 Ex parte Guernsey, 21 111. 442 (1859).
43207 U.S. 463 (1908).
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ney-General appeared as an amicus to argue for the validity of the
Employer's Liability Act. In Myers v. United States,4 on the request
of the Court, Senator Pepper presented a brief and an oral argument
concerning the Senate's view on the presidential removal power. In
the Pocket Veto Case,45 at the request of the House Judiciary Com-
inittee, Representative Summers was granted leave to appear and ar-
gue as amicus curiae. Of course, the practice is not limited to govern-
ment officials. In the first Flag Salute Case,4 the Committee on the
Bill of Rights of the American Bar Association and the American
Civil Liberties Union appeared as amici.
In the current Supreme Court battle over civil rights, the amicus
has played an influential role. In the school segregation cases the ami-
cus was a frequent contributor to the thinking of the court. The At-
torney-General was invited by the court to file a brief and partici-
pate in oral argument. 47 He was also invited to participate in the
re-argument on the specific relief to be granted, and the Attorneys-
General of the states permitting or requiring segregation were al-
lowed to appear as amici curiae if they so requested.""
Such appearances are not limited to courts of last resort. The Su-
preme Court of New York, Trial Term, allowed seven amici curiae to
file briefs in a case involving the specific performance of racial re-
strictive covenants in a deed.49
MODERN AMICUS CURIAE PROCEDURE
To secure the services of an amicus curiae on its own motion the
court need only make the request, either informally and merely sig-
nifying in the listing of counsel of record that the party appears as
amicus curiae or by formally entering the request in the record.
The procedure by which the services of volunteer amicus curiae
are permitted is closely regulated. In the early Common Law any man
could inform the court as amicus, but with the increase in the use of
the practice its limitation became necessary.
In Illinois, the mere fact that the case will affect the interests of the
44 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
45 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
46 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
47 Brown v. Board of Education, 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
48 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49 Kemp v. Rubin, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 510 (1946).
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amicus in another pending litigation does not necessarily justify inter-
vention as amicus curiae. The motion for leave to file as amicus curiae
must be made unaccompanied by a brief. Appearance as amicus curiae
is only allowed where the court feels that such aid is necessary or ad-
visable to protect the court in the consideration of the case.50
In the federal courts the volunteer amicus curiae is met by similar
restrictions, both by case law5' and by rule of court. 52 The United
States Supreme Court does not favor the filing of amicus curiae briefs
without consent of parties to the suit except when done by the United
States and individual states by their respective Attorneys-General. 53
Under modern restrictions, the amicus curiae may appear only by
leave or at request of the' court. His motion for leave to appear, un-
accompanied by his brief, must convince the court that it would be to
the court's advantage to receive the brief.
The original cause or occasion for the introduction of the amicus
curiae practice into the common law has completely disappeared. If
the cause was the Roman consilium practice, then the power of the
court to require the counsel in a case to brief any point the court may
deem important plus the practice of providing law clerks for the ap-
pellate judges would obviate the necessity of having the power to ap-
point someone else to do the same thing. If the cause was the nature of
the early common law criminal proceedings, the safeguards of the
United States and Illinois Constitutions and appellate review of crim-
inal convictions makes the practice unnecessary for that purpose.
There still remains justification for the practice under the restric-
tions placed on the practice. It is an appropriate means to protect a
party's interest when the interest is not sufficient to justify interven-
tion in the suit.54 Further, in a common law system it is a matter of
public interest that each precedent which makes up the body of the
law shall be as close to right as skillful and disinterested effort can
make it. The court's attention should be drawn to obvious error or
facts that the parties have failed to present due to ineptitude or self-
interest. In so doing, the amicus curiae may prove a true friend of the
court.
5 0 Froehler v. North American Life Insurance Co., 374 111. 17, 27 N.E.2d 833 (1940).
51 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 191 U.S. 555 (1903).
52 28 U.S.C.A., Sup. Ct. R. 27(9) (Supp., 1958).
53 28 U.S.C.A., Sup. Ct. R. 27 (9) (b) (d) (Supp., 1958).
54 United States v. Du Pont de Nemours & Co, 13 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. M11, 1953).
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